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I. The problem of the admissibility of genetic enhancement 
 
The present paper deals with an oft-raised argument against the admissibility of 
enhancing an embryo’s nature through genetic engineering (hereafter: genetic enhancement), 
namely, the argument from autonomy. The argument asserts that genetic enhancement is not 
admissible because it violates human autonomy (i.e., the autonomy of a person who is to grow 
up from the embryo subjected to genetic engineering). Clearly, in order to appraise this 
argument, one must have a clear understanding of the notion of autonomy. Accordingly, a 
large part of this paper is devoted to clarifying this notoriously unclear notion. The 
clarification proceeds in two stages. First, a distinction is made between personal and moral 
autonomy. Second, the concept of presuppositions of moral autonomy is introduced. It is 
argued that one can distinguish two conceptions of moral autonomy depending on whether 
one assumes that the contingency of birth is a presupposition of moral autonomy or not. In the 
final part of the paper, relations between the two conceptions of moral autonomy and two 




A. Two concepts of autonomy  
 
As it seems, there are two concepts of autonomy – personal and moral. As we shall 
see, personal autonomy has two varieties, and moral autonomy has three varieties. 
 
1. Personal autonomy 
 
Personal autonomy can be defined as the agent’s freedom at the level of choosing her 
desires (preferences, goals). The somewhat vague phrase ‘having freedom at the level of 
choosing one’s desires’ can be explicated in the following way: ‘having the second-order 
capacity to distance oneself from one’s first-order, i.e., action-guiding desires, to evaluate 
them in a critical way by considering reasons for their acceptance and for the acceptance of 
alternative desires, and to change them if they do not pass critical scrutiny’. The concept of 
 personal autonomy has two varieties – material and formal. The formal variety does not 
forestall what desires (preferences, goals, etc.) an agent should choose (whether they be moral 
or amoral, whether they are to satisfy some ideal of human excellence or not, whether they are 
to be loyalty, commitment, obedience to a group or rather some kind of substantive 
independence, whether they can be self-destructive or not). The only thing it requires is that 
an agent should be able to critically evaluate her first-order desires, and, should these desires 
not pass the critical evaluation, to change them. Accordingly, on this variant, a personally 
autonomous agent can be just as well a self-sufficient individualist insensitive to the needs of 
others as an altruist treating others’ needs as one’s own needs – just as well a villain as a saint, 
etc. By contrast, the material variety requires that an agent should choose a specific type of 
desires (moral, realising some ideal of human excellence, prudent, or rational, etc.).1 
 Three further remarks on the formal variety of the concept of personal autonomy are 
in order here. First, personal autonomy does not operate in an all-or-nothing fashion; rather, 
an agent may be personally autonomous to a higher or lesser degree. As it seems, though, no 
human being can be called an agent (i.e., the true author of her own actions) if she loses 
completely her personal autonomy. This is so because the agent’s first-order, i.e. action-
guiding desires can be really called hers only if she really wants to have these desires, i.e., if 
she has second-order desires to have and to realise her first-order desires. Accordingly, some 
level of personal autonomy is indispensable to human agency (though, as it must  be admitted, 
it is difficult to determine what level exactly constitutes the threshold between agency and the 
lack of agency). As we shall see presently, the fact that in order to be called ‘an agent’ a 
subject must exhibit some level of personal autonomy is relevant to the question about the 
relations between personal autonomy and moral autonomy. Second, personal autonomy is a 
value – a desirable feature of human being. One can argue for this claim indirectly: personal 
autonomy is a value, as it is a necessary condition of human agency, or directly: personal 
autonomy is a value because the very capacity not to yield unreflectively to one’s first-order 
desires is valuable in itself. Third, personal autonomy should be distinguished from freedom 
at the level of realising one’s desires, i.e., from freedom understood as the lack of obstacles in 
realising one’s desires. It is worth noting that an agent may be personally autonomous and 
free (in the sense ‘encountering no obstacles in realising her desires’), personally autonomous 
                                                 
1Defining autonomy as a second-order capacity, i.e., as a capacity to distance oneself from one’s first order, i.e., 
action-guiding desires, is widespread in the relevant literature. Also my distinction between formal and material 
autonomy is not new. See, for instance, G. DWORKIN, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 6th ed., 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001 (Dworkin writes about formal and substantive autonomy); H. G. 
FRANKFURT, “Freedom of the Will and a Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, 1971, No 68, pp. 5-
25.  
 and non-free, personally non-autonomous and free, and personally non-autonomous and non-
free.  
Let me now turn to the second concept of autonomy – moral autonomy. 
 
2. Moral autonomy 
 
Moral autonomy can be defined as the agent’s capacity to reflectively choose moral 
principles which are to govern her actions and/or reflectively affirm moral principles which 
she already accepts (and which she may have originally accepted on unreflective grounds), 
i.e., as the capacity for normative self-government. I shall call this understanding of moral 
autonomy ‘the strong variety of moral autonomy’ (to be distinguished from its two other 
varieties discussed below). This variety has a formal and material variant. The material 
variant specifies what moral principles an agent should reflectively choose and affirm if she is 
to be called ‘morally autonomous’, while the formal variant requires only that the agent 
should reflectively choose moral principles which are to govern her actions and/or reflectively 
affirm moral principles she already accepts.  
Moral autonomy can be understood also in a weaker way – as the capacity to 
understand moral principles as a specific kind of reasons for action (i.e., as different from 
conventional rules) requiring obedience in an especially categorical way. I call this 
understanding of moral autonomy ‘the weak variety of moral autonomy’. What this variety 
implies is that an agent understands moral principles qua moral principles. In other words, it 
implies that an agent can discern the specificity of moral principles which consists in that they 
(as opposed to conventional rules) constitute particularly strong reasons for action, i.e., 
reasons overriding other reasons for action. It does not imply that the agent has the capacity to 
reflectively choose moral principles and/or reflectively affirm principles which she already 
accepts. Of note is the fact that this variety of moral autonomy constitutes a cognitive element 
of the moral sense and thereby a condition of moral accountability (the second element of the 
moral sense is motivational – it is a tendency of the agent to comply with moral principles). 
Accordingly, an agent who commits a crime can be held morally accountable for her deed 
only if she exhibits a cognitive element of the moral sense (clearly, by definition, such an 
agent has a defective motivational element of the moral sense). Similarly to the strong variety 
of moral autonomy, one can also distinguish a material and formal variant of the weak variety 
of moral autonomy. 
 Apart from the strong and weak variety of moral autonomy, one should also mention 
about what can be called ‘Kantian moral autonomy’ or ‘the strongest variety of moral 
autonomy’. Kantian moral autonomy can be defined as the agent’s capacity to reflectively 
choose moral principles which are to govern her actions and/or reflectively affirm moral 
principles which she already accepts, and – additionally – to be motivated by these moral 
principles alone, without interference of any empirical causes. Analogously to the weak and 
strong variety of moral autonomy, Kantian moral autonomy can also be divided into a formal 
and material variant. As can be readily seen, the formal variant of Kantian moral autonomy 
implies the formal variant of the strong variety of moral autonomy (which, in turn, implies the 
formal variant of the weak variety of moral autonomy). 
The results of the analyses conducted in sections 1 and 2 can be schematically 
summarized in the following way: 
 
Personal autonomy 
I. Formal variety (second-order capacity to choose one’s first-order desires; it is not 
specified which desires should be chosen). 
II. Material variety (second-order capacity to choose one’s first-order desires; it is 
specified which desires should be chosen). 
 
Moral autonomy   
I. Weak variety  
1. Formal variant (understanding moral principles qua moral principles; moral 
principles are not specified). 
2. Material variant (understanding moral principles qua moral principles; moral 
principles are specified). 
II. Strong variety 
1.   Formal variant (capacity to reflectively choose moral principles which are to 
govern one’s actions and/or reflectively affirm moral principles which one already accepts; it 
is not specified which moral principles should be chosen). 
2.   Material variant (capacity to reflectively choose moral principles which are to 
govern one’s actions and/or reflectively affirm moral principles which one already accepts; it 
is specified which moral principles should be chosen). 
III. Strongest variety (Kantian moral autonomy) 
 1. Formal variant (capacity to reflectively choose moral principles which are to govern 
one’s actions and/or reflectively affirm moral principles which one already accepts, and to be 
motivated by these moral principles alone, without interference of any empirical causes; it is 
not specified which moral principles should be chosen). 
2. Material variant (capacity to reflectively choose moral principles which are to 
govern one’s actions and/or reflectively affirm moral principles which one already accepts, 
and to be motivated by these moral principles alone, without interference of any empirical 
causes; it is specified which moral principles should be chosen). 
 
In the remainder of this paper, by personal autonomy I shall mean ‘the formal variety 
of personal autonomy’, and by moral autonomy I shall mean ‘the formal variant of the strong 
variety of moral autonomy’. The narrowing down of my considerations to the two varieties of 
autonomy is due to the fact these two varieties seem to be the best explications of the concepts 
of personal and moral autonomy. The material variety of personal autonomy seems to be too 
strong: the requirement that an autonomous agent ought to choose a concrete type of firs-
order desires does not harmonize well with the notion of personal autonomy as it is usually 
used in the philosophical discourse. Besides, the material variety of personal autonomy 
becomes hard to distinguish from moral autonomy. As for moral autonomy, its weak variety 
seems to be too thin – moral autonomy seems to require something more than just the 
capacity to understand moral principles qua moral principles, while its strongest variety seems 
to be too thick – moral autonomy does not have to require that the agent should have the 
capacity to be motivated by moral considerations alone. However, I want to emphasize that, in 
my view, all the above varieties of autonomy are legitimate explications of the notion of 
autonomy. The formal variety of personal autonomy and the formal variant of the strong 
variety of moral autonomy seem to be just the best explications from among a number of 
legitimate explications, i.e., they seem to be explications that capture best the specificity of 
the concept of autonomy as it is used in the philosophical discourse. 
Before I turn to the problem of the presuppositions of moral autonomy, I shall devote 
some attention to the problem of the relationships between these two concepts. Two different 
views of these relationships emerge. The first view states that they are entirely independent in 
the sense that an agent can be morally autonomous without being personally autonomous. 
This view leads to a rather counterintuitive conclusion that an agent’s being entirely incapable 
of freely shaping and/or changing her first-order desires does not exclude her capacity to 
reflectively choose and/or reflectively affirm moral principles. According to the second view, 
 the two concepts are partially dependent in the sense that an agent must be at least to some 
extent personally autonomous in order to be morally autonomous (to the same extent to which 
human agency presupposes personal autonomy, because moral autonomy presupposes human 
agency). This second view seems to be more plausible, because the capacity to reflectively 
choose and/or affirm moral principles seems to require some level of the capacity to distance 
oneself from one’s first-order desires.  
 
B. Presuppositions of autonomy 
 
What has been said so far – that there are two main concepts of autonomy, and that 
moral autonomy presupposes human agency (‘being a true author of one’s actions’), which, in 
turn, presupposes some level of personal autonomy – seems to be rather uncontroversial. 
What is controversial is whether moral autonomy has any other presuppositions and whether 
personal autonomy has any presuppositions at all. Before tackling these questions, let me 
clarify the concept of a presupposition of autonomy (used so far intuitively). Presuppositions 
of autonomy are conditions that must be satisfied in order to make sense of the concept of 
autonomy. They are therefore conditions which have to be met if one wants to speak of true 
rather than apparent autonomy. Accordingly, if a presupposition of a given concept of 
autonomy is not satisfied, the concept, so to say, falls apart: an agent who chooses her desires 
in a free way is only apparently personally autonomous, and an agent who chooses and/or 
affirms moral principles which are to govern her actions is only apparently morally 
autonomous. In short and less metaphorically, the notion of a presupposition can be equated 
with the notion of a necessary condition. This account of the notion of presupposition is 
general – it refers also to presuppositions of other notions than autonomy – for instance, to the 
notion of human agency, which strictly connected with the notion of autonomy. In the 
following two sections I shall argue that personal autonomy does not have any 
presuppositions, that it is not entirely clear whether human agency has two presuppositions 
(personal autonomy, free will) or three presuppositions (personal autonomy, free will, the 
contingency of birth), and – consequently – that it is not clear whether moral autonomy 





 1. Free will 
 
Free will can be defined as the capacity to choose alternative actions in a given 
situation: an agent who has chosen an action at a given time has free will if she could have 
chosen some other action at that time. The question arises whether free will can be regarded a 
presupposition of personal or moral autonomy.  
Personal autonomy requires that an agent have a second-order capacity to critically 
evaluate and to change her first-order desires. Now, there seems to be no connection between 
thus understood personal autonomy and free will. There seems to be no contradiction in 
assuming that an agent has the above mentioned second-order capacity and does not have 
free-will, i.e., that she has the second-order capacity but all her thoughts, desires, actions are 
inevitable consequences of preceding events. In short, an agent can have the second-order 
capacity and simultaneously be deprived of free will. However, one may plausibly argue that 
even though free will is not a presupposition of personal autonomy, it is a presupposition of 
human agency. This is so because if an agent is deprived of free will, i.e., if her actions are 
just links in causal chains, then she can hardly be called ‘an agent’ – a true author of her 
actions. Accordingly, it seems plausible to maintain that human agency has (at least) two 
presuppositions – not only some level of personal autonomy but also free will. However, one 
could criticize this account of the relations between personal autonomy, free will and human 
agency by pointing out that free will is personal autonomy.2 This explication of free will, 
though, seems to forfeit what seems to be an essential part of free will – the capacity to 
choose various options in a given situation, or, put alternatively, not being determined to 
choose a given option in a given situation. Accordingly, free will should be regarded as a 
presupposition of human agency, not as the presupposition of personal autonomy. Personal 
autonomy and free will should therefore be regarded as two different presuppositions of 
human agency.  
Let me now turn to the question of whether free will is a presupposition of moral 
autonomy. Moral autonomy requires that an agent reflectively choose and/or affirm moral 
principles which are to govern her actions. Since the requirement that agent should 
reflectively choose and/or affirm moral principles implies that an agent should assume moral 
accountability for not complying with these principles, it can be said that moral autonomy 
implies moral accountability. And it can be plausibly argued that moral accountability for not 
                                                 
2Such explication of the notion of free will was put forward by Harry G. Frankfurt; see H. FRANKFURT, 
“Freedom of the Will”, o.c. 
 complying with moral principles is justified only if the agent is not causally determined to act 
in a given way, i.e., if she has free will. Moral autonomy, therefore, presupposes free will. 
Clearly, one may argue for this just by pointing out that it is a direct consequence of the above 
account of the relations between personal autonomy, free will and human agency: given that 
some level of personal autonomy and free will are presuppositions of human agency, and that 
moral autonomy seems unthinkable without human agency, then moral autonomy presupposes 
free will (and some level of personal autonomy).  
 
2. The contingency of birth 
 
As we shall see, the question of whether the contingency of birth is a presupposition of 
human agency and thereby of moral autonomy is much more intricate than the question of 
whether free will constitutes such a presupposition. The claim that the contingency of birth is 
crucial for moral autonomy was put forward by Jürgen Habermas.3 Habermas argues that our 
ethical self-knowledge as a species is grounded in the fact that our genetic constitution does 
not depend on the will of other persons, i.e., is contingent. What Habermas means by that is 
that a person cannot consider herself to be a real author of her actions and – more generally – 
of her life if she knows that other people decided about her genetic constitution. Accordingly, 
a person whose birth was not contingent cannot be expected to be able to take full 
responsibility for her actions, and thereby cannot be morally autonomous. Habermas’s 
argument can therefore be plausibly construed as saying that the contingency of human birth 
is a presupposition of human agency. This argument is very profound – it seems to capture 
something really important about the nature of human agency and autonomy. However, it is 
not easy to articulate what exactly it captures and how it should be ultimately assessed. I shall 
start my analysis of Habermas’s argument from a remark that if this argument is correct, it is 
not as self-evidently correct as the argument that some level of personal autonomy and free 
will are presuppositions of human agency. While it is (at least, in my view) self-evident that 
the possession of the second-order capacity to distance oneself from one’s first-order desires 
(personal autonomy) and the capacity to have a real choice between various first-order desires 
(free will) are presuppositions of human agency, there seems to be nothing self-evident in the 
claim that human agency requires that a subject’s genetic constitution should not have been 
                                                 
3
 See J. HABERMAS, Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik, Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001. Habermas mentions that similar claim was made earlier by Hannah Arendt 
who (in The Human Condition) introduced the notion of natality as a pre-condition of human ability to initiate 
action. 
 designed by some other person. One might say that if a subject is personally autonomous and 
has free will, there seems to be nothing more needed to call her ‘an agent’. Accordingly, it 
seems that the lack of contingency of birth does not by itself undermine human agency; it 
undermines it only in so far as it decreases personal autonomy beneath the ‘threshold level’ 
between agency and the lack of agency and/or violates her free will. Therefore, on this 
interpretation of human agency, contingency of birth is not a presupposition of human agency. 
Is therefore Habermas’s claim that contingency of birth is a presupposition of human agency 
untenable? The matters are not so simple. There seem to be two main ways of defending this 
claim – one may call them ‘philosophical’ and ‘psychological’. The philosophical way 
consists in pointing out that if we really deeply understand the concept of human agency as 
the concept of true authorship of one’s actions, we cannot fail to notice that this concept 
requires the contingency of birth; absent the contingency of birth, our authorship is not ‘true’, 
for the simple reason that we were designed not just by chance (which, on this argument, is a 
condition of our being true authors of our actions) but by some other person’s conscious will. 
This way of defending Habermas’s argument, however, encounters serious difficulties. First, 
one repeat the above made remark that the conception of human agency as based on personal 
autonomy and free will is sufficiently profound, so that there is no need to make it still ‘more 
profound’ by positing a somewhat obscure condition of the contingency of birth. Second, one 
may point out that, contrary to what Habermas seems to assume, the contingency of birth is an 
all-or-nothing notion. It is true that either a birth is contingent or not. However, it is also true 
that there is a fundamental difference between a negligent and substantial intervention in the 
embryo’s genotype. On Habermas’s view both types of intervention seem to undermine 
human agency to the same degree, while on the view that the contingency of birth is not a 
presupposition of human agency, they undermine human agency in varying degrees – 
depending on how they affect the presuppositions of human agency (personal autonomy and 
free will). The latter view seems more plausible. What’s more, the view that the contingency 
of birth is a presupposition of human agency gives rise to a counterintuitive conclusion that an 
elimination of an embryo’s genetic defects (i.e., negative genetic engineering) with a view to 
enabling the child’s normal functioning as a human being undermines her agency (whereas, in 
fact, it would be right to say that it enables her agency). This counterintuitive conclusion can 
be avoided if we reject the claim that the contingency of birth is a presupposition of human 
agency. The psychological way of defending Habermas’s argument, in turn, consists in 
asserting that a person who is aware that her birth was not contingent, i.e., that her genetic 
constitution was consciously shaped by other people, is unlikely to feel herself to be a true 
 agent and thereby is unlikely to be able to reflectively choose and/or affirm moral principles 
which are to govern her actions, and, consequently, to accept moral accountability for 
compliance with these principles. One can respond to this argument by saying that this feeling 
of the lack of agency which an agent is likely to experience if she knows that her birth was not 
contingent can be eliminated by rationally arguing to her that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of agency are personal autonomy and free will (or, if possible, by not revealing to 
her the information about the non-contingency of her birth). However, one could strengthen 
the psychological argument by claiming that such rational argumentation is not sufficient to 
eliminate this feeling, as this feeling is overwhelming, not open to rational argumentation 
about the bases of agency. Whether this feeling can be of such kind is an empirical question. 
In my view, it is rather implausible to maintain that it can. But even if it could, what would it 
show? Clearly, it would not show that contingency of birth is a presupposition of human 
agency. It would only show that a person who knows that her birth was not contingent is 
likely to experience a difficulty with feeling herself the true author of her actions and thereby 
with taking full responsibility for her actions. But, let me repeat the point already made, by 
virtue of this fact the contingency of birth would not become a presupposition of human 
agency.  
To sum up, the foregoing considerations seem to support the claim that contingency of 
birth is not a presupposition of human agency and thereby of moral autonomy. It is difficult, 
though, to provide a conclusive argument for this claim. Especially, it will be difficult to 
convince someone who just posits that the profound conception of human agency implies the 
contingency of birth. Therefore, given that it is not entirely clear what the presuppositions of 
human agency and thereby of moral autonomy are, one should distinguish two competing 
conceptions of moral autonomy (the arrows on the figures point to presuppositions of a given 
concept):  








                Personal autonomy                                          Free will 








                Personal autonomy        Free will       Contingency of birth 
 
 
III. Genetic enhancement  
  
Before passing to the problem of whether genetic enhancement violates human 
autonomy, it is necessary to distinguish two markedly different types of genetic enhancement 
(the distinction to be presented is widespread in the relevant literature4). The first type, which 
I call ‘directed genetic enhancement’, consists in that a decision-maker (e.g., parents) has an 
embryo’s genotype modified in such a way that the embryo’s development is strongly 
determined to proceed in a certain definite direction (i.e., a child is strongly determined to 
choose a given way of life wished by the decision-maker). The second type, which I call ‘all-
purpose genetic enhancement’, consists in that a decision-maker (e.g., parents) has an 
embryo’s genotype modified in a way that increases the embryo’s overall capacities and 
powers to effectively pursue various life careers but does not determine the choice of any of 
those careers. Three additional remarks regarding the notion of genetic enhancement seem to 
be in order. First, when I speak of genetic enhancement and its influence on human autonomy, 
I mean a situation in which some decision-maker decides to enhance the nature of an embryo 
through genetic engineering, not just eliminate its defects that would preclude the embryo’s 
normal functioning as a human being; I mean, then, positive, not negative, genetic 
engineering. Incidentally, it is worth noticing that negative genetic engineering does not seem 
to pose serious problems in the context of autonomy (unless, as mentioned, one assumes that 
                                                 
4For a discussion of various aspects of genetic enhancement see, e.g., J. HARRIS, Enhancing Evolution. The 
Ethical Case for Making Better People, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007; M. J. SANDEL, The Case 
against Perfection. Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering, Cambridge MA., Harvard University Press, 2007; 
P. VEZZONI, Il futuro e il passato dell’uomo. Considerazioni sull’evoluzione umana, Milano, Bruno 
Mondadori, 2006. 
 
 contingency of birth is a presupposition of human agency): it enables a child’s proper 
functioning of human beings, and therefore it enables her/his autonomy. Second, since the 
decision-maker may be – but does not have to be – the child’s parents (the decision-maker 
may be, e.g., the state), the situation may take place both in the context of ‘liberal eugenics’ 
and in the context of ‘authoritarian (state) eugenics’; the crucial point is only that some 
decision-maker decides to improve the other human being’s – an embryo’s – nature through 
genetic engineering. Third, an essentially different situation arises when a decision-maker 
uses genetic engineering to improve her own nature. In this situation genetic enhancement 
does not seem to pose any obvious threat to autonomy. It may be an expression of one’s 
personal autonomy or not, depending on whether a subject has freely chosen her first-order 
desire to undergo a genetic improvement or not. And, depending on concrete effects of this 
improvement, it may diminish, increase, or leave intact her personal and moral autonomy.  
 
IV. Does genetic enhancement violate human autonomy? 
  
The answer to the question of genetic enhancement violates autonomy will depend on 
which conception of moral autonomy one accepts.  
If one accepts the conception I of moral autonomy, then the answer will comprise the 
following theses:  
(1) Directed genetic enhancement diminishes personal autonomy. This is so because 
by determining an agent through genetic engineering to choose a concrete life career or at 
least to be capable of choosing from a smaller set of life careers than she would have been 
without the genetic intervention, one undermines the effectiveness of her second-order 
capacity to freely choose her goals. However, directed genetic enhancement does not have to 
affect moral autonomy. As argued, moral autonomy is only partially dependent on personal 
autonomy. Accordingly, the violation of personal autonomy will also be a violation of moral 
autonomy only if the violation of personal autonomy is so substantial as to make personal 
autonomy fall beneath ‘the threshold level’ between agency and the lack of agency. 
(2) All-purpose genetic enhancement does not diminish personal autonomy and does 
not affect in any way moral autonomy. Au contraire: all-purpose genetic enhancement 
increases a subject’s personal autonomy, as it widens the range of goals from among which 
she can choose those goals she wishes to be hers.   
If one accepts the conception II of moral autonomy, then the answer to the question of 
whether genetic enhancement violates autonomy will be composed of the following theses: 
 (1) Directed genetic enhancement diminishes personal autonomy (for the same reasons 
as it does on the grounds of the conception I of moral autonomy). Directed genetic 
enhancement violates moral autonomy, as it violates one of the presuppositions of human 
agency (and thereby of moral autonomy), namely, the contingency of birth. 
(2) All-purpose genetic enhancement does not diminish personal autonomy but it 
violates moral autonomy (because it violates one of the presuppositions of moral autonomy, 
namely, the contingency of birth). 
It should also be noted that irrespective of which conception of autonomy we accept, 
the following thesis holds: no type of genetic enhancement threatens the first presupposition 
of human agency – free will, since if one believes that humans possess free will, one will 
continue to do so, even if one knows that they are ‘designed’, not contingently born. 
Clearly, for anyone for whom autonomy is an important value and who accepts the 
conception II of moral autonomy, the conflict between moral autonomy and genetic 
enhancement will be a strong argument against the admissibility of the genetic enhancement 
of embryos. However, as I have argued, the conception II of moral autonomy seems to be less 
plausible than the conception I. The preceding remark, though, does not imply that, if we 
accept the conception II or moral autonomy, genetic enhancement of embryos becomes 
admissible, because, apart from the argument from autonomy, one may advance many other 
arguments against genetic enhancement, not discussed in the paper. 
 
